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"THE EXECUTIONER'S FACE IS ALWAYS WELL-HIDDEN'":




The common wisdom is that death penalty cases play out on a
landscape that pits the forces of retribution and punishment against the
forces of abolition and rehabilitation. Supporters, or so the simplified
version goes, applaud the death penalty for insuring that the perpetrators
of the most wanton and vilest murders receive the ultimate penalty.
Opponents, again oversimplifying, argue both that the penalty is immoral
(that the state does not have the moral authority to take the life of another,
no matter how depraved the crime) and inherently inequitable (that for a
combination of racial, class, and political biases, it is impossible to create
a system in which only the truly worst-of-the-worst capital defendants are
subject to a death sentence).
Arguments, both pro and con, vacillate between high-end theory and
street anecdote. The pro-death penalty literature often appears to combine
Immanuel Kant and the New York Post; the anti-literature substitutes
Albert Camus and the Village Voice.
On September 1, 1995, New York joined thirty-seven other states' in
allowing for legal executions.' Much of the debate over the passage of
the death penalty act tracked these philosophical and anecdotal arguments.
Yet, when the inevitable parade of death-eligible defendants comes before
the trial courts, two issues-never mentioned by supporters, and rarely
cited by opponents-often have the most significant impact on who is to
be executed and who is not: (1) the adequacy of counsel provided to
individuals facing the death penalty; and (2) the way that counsel, judges
and juries develop and construe mental disability evidence in death penalty
cases. Because these issues are so rarely discussed in public fora, the
* BOB DYLAN, A Hard Rain's A-Gonna Fall, on THE FREEWHEELIN' BOB DYLAN
(Columbia Records 1963).
** Professor of Law, New York Law School; A.B., Rutgers University, 1966; J.D.,
Columbia University School of Law, 1969. The author wishes to thank Jayne South for
her helpful research assistance, and Douglas Mossman, M.D., for his helpful comments
on an earlier draft. This article is adapted from a presentation given at the 21st annual
conference of the Tri-State Chapter of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law,
at Mt. Sinai Medical Center, New York City, Jan. 20, 1996.
1. See Around the Nation, Wash. Post, Sept. 2, 1995, at A2.
2. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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public has little sense of their significance to ultimate death decision-
making. As a result of so little attention being paid to these issues in so
many cases where the death penalty is actually ordered and carried out,
"the executioner's face," quoting from Bob Dylan's chilling song, A Hard
Rain's A-Gonna Fall, "is often well hidden."
This paper will proceed in the following manner. First, I will provide
a brief overview of what we know about both variables-that is, adequacy
of counsel and the construction of mental disability evidence. Then, I will
look at the New York statute and offer some predictions as to how these
variables may likely play out in New York cases (with a few thoughts
about how they have developed in New Jersey in the fourteen years since
it reinstated the death penalty). Finally, I will seek to contextualize both
of these variables through three jurisprudential filters to which my
attention has increasingly turned in recent years: "sanism," "pre-
textuality," and "therapeutic jurisprudence."
I. THE VARIABLES
A. Provision of Counsel
An examination of the full range of death penalty cases that have been
litigated in the past twenty years since the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Gregg v. Georgia,3 holding that the death penalty was not
necessarily a violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment,' suggests one undeniable truth: in an amazingly high
number of cases, the most critical issue in determining whether a
defendant lives or dies is the quality of counsel. As suggested by one
veteran death penalty litigator, "[t]he death penalty will too often be
punishment not for committing the worst crime, but for being assigned the
worst lawyer.'
3. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
4. See id. at 187; James S. Liebman & Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Capital
Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating
Factor, 66 GEo. L.J. 757 (1978); see generally 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 17.08 (1989) (discussing the impact of mental
disorder on the penalty phase of capital punishment litigation).
5. Stephen Bright, Death by Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in
Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L.
REV. 679, 695 (1990) [hereinafter Bright, Death by Lottery]; see Stephen Bright, Counsel
for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime, but for the Worst Lawyer,
103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994); see also David Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of
Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23,
61 (1991) (noting that the correlation is statistically significant); Gary Goodpaster, The
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The responsibilities of lawyers in death penalty cases are legion. The
attorney must develop a meaningful relationship with a client who is likely
the target of public and media animosity, and whose unpopularity may
taint the quality of that relationship; thus, she must find a way to
"humanize" her client.6 She must investigate for mitigating evidence,'
obtain expert defense witnesses,8 investigate to rebut aggravating
evidence, 9 and attempt to negotiate a plea bargain where appropriate."0
If a guilty verdict is rendered, she must be prepared to make informed
strategic decisions about the penalty phase."
Look at cases randomly. Or, choose a group that involves, say,
felony murder, or potentially biased jurors, or a tainted confession, or any
other sorting device. If these cases are carefully read (in some cases, not
very much care is needed, to be sure), the significance of counsel leaps
off the page.'2 No one has seriously contradicted Professor Welsh White
that "[t]he single greatest problem with our system of capital punishment
is the quality of representation afforded capital defendants." 3
Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 299, 317 (1983) (explaining why counsel's role is even more critical in death cases
than in other criminal prosecutions).
6. Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving
Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 323, 361 (1993).
7. See id. at 340-41.
8. See id. at 342-43.
9. See id. at 344-45.
10. See id. at 368-74.
11. See id. at 356-68. See generally Laurin Wollan, Representing the Death Row
Inmate: The Ethics of Advocacy, Collateral Style, in FACING THE DEATH PENALTY:
ESSAYS IN CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 92 (Michael L. Radelet ed. 1989)
(discussing the representation of death row inmates in collateral proceedings); James M.
Doyle, The Lawyers'Art: "Representation" in Capital Cases, 8 YALE J.L & HUMAN.
417 (1996) (discussing the importance of shaping a client's image).
On the intractable question of an attorney's responsibility when her client desires
to waive post-conviction proceedings in a capital case, see State v. Martini, 677 A.2d.
1106 (N.J. 1996) (holding that defendant could not waive post-conviction purview).
12. On the role of counsel generally in death penalty cases, see TASK FORCE ON
DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, TOWARD A MORE JUST AND
EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES 49-76 (1990)
[hereinafter ABA REPORT]; Panel Discussion, The Death of Fairness: Counsel
Competency and Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOUS. L. REv. 1105 (1994).
On the role of counsel generally, see Symposium, Toward a More Effective Right to
Assistance of Counsel, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1-138 (Winter 1995).
13. White, supra note 6, at 376 (emphasis added).
1996]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
A Harvard Law Review survey article is blunt: "[t]he utter inadequacy
of trial and appellate lawyers for capital defendants has been widely
recognized as the single most spectacular failure in the administration of
capital punishment." 4 This inadequacy is so pervasive, the survey
concludes, as to by itself make the death penalty "unconstitutionally
arbitrary. "15 Professor Bruce Green, relying on similar data, also
reasons that-in reality-many of the defendants who have been tried,
convicted and sentenced to death have been deprived of their constitutional
right to counsel.'
6
Why is this? Many reasons have been offered, but one starting point
is Douglas Vick's recent analysis:
The literature is replete with impressionistic, anecdotal, and
empirical evidence that indigent capital defendants are routinely
denied assistance of counsel adequate to put into practice the
protections that on paper make the death penalty constitutional.
This crisis in capital representation is caused by funding systems
that discourage experienced and competent criminal attorneys
from taking appointments in death penalty cases and prevent even
the most talented attorneys from preparing an adequate defense,
particularly for the penalty phase. 7
Capital defendants are typically represented by "the bottom of the
bar." 8 Ten percent of death row prisoners in Alabama were represented
by trial lawyers subsequently disbarred or disciplined. ' 9 Almost thirteen
percent of such inmates in Louisiana were represented by similar
counsel; 2° almost twenty-five percent of Kentucky's death row inmates
were represented by lawyers since disbarred or suspended. 2' An
14. Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital
Trials, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1923, 1923 (1994) (emphasis added) (citing ABA REPORT,
supra note 12, at 7); see also Goodpaster, supra note 5, at 302).
15. Note, supra note 14, at 1923.
16. See Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth
Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REv. 433, 433 (1993).
17. Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services
and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 329, 397-98 (1995).
18. Stephanie Saul, When Death Is the Penalty:Attorneys for Poor Defendants Often
Lack Experience and Skill, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 25, 1991, at 8.
19. See Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death
Belt, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30.
20. See id.
21. See Saul, supra note 18, at 8.
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appointed counsel in a death case told the press, "I despise [being
appointed], I'd rather take a whipping .. . 22 An American Bar
Association (ABA) Report on the representation of Georgia defendants
facing the death penalty concluded:
[The state's] recent experience with capital punishment has been
marred by examples of inadequate representation ranging from
virtually no representation at all by counsel, to representation by
inexperienced counsel, to failures to investigate basic threshold
questions, to lack of knowledge of governing law, to lack of
advocacy on the issue of guilt, to failure to present a case for life
at the penalty phase3
And one often gets what one pays for. Professor Robert Weisberg, an
appellate defense counsel in death cases, has mordantly noted: "The fees
[at trial] were infamously low. The second capital appeal I worked on was
a case where the defense lawyer was paid $150 for the entire case, and,
believe me, he earned every penny of it."24 Vick thus concludes on this
point:
In sum, every shortcoming in the quality of capital
defense-the disproportionate number of incompetent attorneys
assigned to death cases, the lack of experience and expertise of
defense counsel, the repeated failure of defense attorneys to
investigate and present available mitigating evidence-is
ultimately rooted in society's unwillingness to pay for a
meaningful defense in death penalty casesY
It does not appear as if there is any relief in sight. Since 1983, when
the Supreme Court established a pallid, nearly-impossible-to-violate,
adequacy standard in Strickland v. Washington (requiring simply that
counsel's efforts be "reasonable" under the circumstances), courts have
become less and less interested in the question at hand, and little evidence
22. Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1522 (11th Cir. 1985).
23. ABA REPORT, supra note 12, at 52-53 (citations omitted).
24. Robert Weisberg, Who Defends Capital Defendants?, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
535, 537 (1995). For examples of cases litigated on appeal by Weisberg, see Mitchell
v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985); Holtan v. Parratt, 683 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir.
1982); People v. Cummings, 850 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1993).
25. Vick, supra note 17, at 410.
26. 466 U.S. 668, 668 (1984).
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disputes the failure of Strickland to insure that capital defendants truly
receive adequate assistance of counsel.'
Individual cases are striking. In one case, counsel was found to be
effective even though he had failed to introduce ballistics evidence
showing that the gun taken from the defendant was not the murder
weapon.' In another case, an attorney was found constitutionally
adequate to provide representation to a death-eligible defendant
notwithstanding the fact that he had been admitted to the bar for only six
months and had never tried a jury case.29 Another lawyer was found
constitutionally adequate even where during the middle of the trial he
appeared in court intoxicated and spent a night in jail.3" In a pre-
Strickland case, defense counsel was not even aware that separate
sentencing proceedings were to be held in death penalty cases. 3  There
is little evidence to contradict Welsh White's conclusion that "[flower
courts' application of Strickland has produced appalling results. "32
Finally, the Supreme Court does not appear inclined to reconsider its
Strickland doctrine. In Alvord v. Wainwright,33 the Court denied
certiorari in a case where defense counsel accepted his client's refusal to
rely on the insanity defense with no independent investigation of his
client's mental or criminal history, despite the fact that the record
demonstrated unequivocally that the defendant had a history of mental
illness and had been acquitted on insanity grounds six years prior to his
27. See Ivan K. Fong, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39
STAN. L. REv. 461, 461-62 (1987); William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin
Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTS. J. 91, 93 (1995).
28. See Graham v. Collins, 829 F. Supp. 204, 209 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
29. See Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1490-92 (9th Cir. 1992).
30. See Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368, 377-78 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
31. See Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792, 797 (11th Cir. 1982).
32. Welsh S. White, Capital Punishment's Future, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1429, 1436
(1993) (reviewing RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1991)).
For other examples, see Stephen Bright, The Death Penalty as the Answer to Crime:
Costly, Counterproductive, and Corrupting, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1068, 1078-84
(1996); Christine Wisermen, Representing the Condemned: A Critique of Capital
Punishment, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 731, 742-44 (1996).
33. 469 U.S. 956 (1984).
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indictment in the current case.' Justice Marshall concluded in his
dissent from the certiorari denial:
The lower court has countenanced a view of counsel's
constitutional duty that is blind to the ability of the individual
defendant to understand his situation and usefully to assist in his
defense. The result is to deny to the persons who are most in
need of it the educated counsel of an attorney. 3
In short, Strickland is a nonstandard that provides virtually no
safeguards for mentally disabled criminal defendants. In death penalty
cases, Strickland is little more than an empty shell. Witnesses before an
ABA Task Force characterized counsel's performance variously as
"'scandalous,' 'shameful,' 'abysmal,' 'pathetic,' [and] 'deplorable.'" 36
In the words of one commentator, Strickland serves merely as a
"gatepostol on the road to legal condemnation. "3
B. Construction of Mental Disability Evidence
1. Introduction
Nearly twenty years ago, when surveying the availability of counsel
to mentally disabled litigants, President Carter's Commission on Mental
Health noted the frequently substandard level of representation made
available to mentally disabled criminal defendants.38 Nothing that has
happened in the past two decades has been a palliative for this problem;
if anything, it is confounded by the myth that adequate counsel is available
to represent both criminal defendants in general, and mentally disabled
34. See id. at 956 (discussing Michael L. Radelet & George W. Barnard, M.D.,
Treating Those Found Incompetent for Execution: Ethical Chaos with Only One Solution,
16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 297, 300 (1988)); cf. People v. Frierson, 705
P.2d 396 (Cal. 1985) (holding that defense counsel could not refuse to honor defendant's
clearly expressed desire to present diminished capacity defense at guilt/special
circumstances phase of death penalty case; question was not merely a tactical decision).
35. Alvord, 469 U.S. at 963.
36. ABA REPORT, supra note 12, at 55 (citation omitted).
37. Bright, Death by Lottery, supra note 5, at 683.
38. See Mental Health and Human Rights: Report of the Task Panel on Legal and
Ethical Issues, 20 ARiz. L. REv. 49, 62 (1978), discussed in Michael L. Perlin,
Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40
CASE W. REs. L. Rlv. 599, 654 (1989-90).
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litigants in particular.39 And, as the importance of the construction of
"mitigating" and "aggravating" evidence grows, so does the need for
counsel to be able to understand and utilize this mental disability
evidence.
2. "Aggravators" and "Mitigators"
Contemporaneous death penalty statutes require findings of what are
called "mitigating" and "aggravating" factors.' This is done to insure
(ostensibly) that the death penalty is reserved for only the vilest of
crimes-ones for which there is no reasonable excuse or justification. IN
New Jersey, for instance, "aggravators" include such circumstances as a
prior murder conviction;4' the defendant's purposeful or knowing
creation of a grave risk of death to one other than the victim;42 the
commission of a murder that was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible,
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
assault to the victim;43 the commission of a murder for hire,' or one
for the purposes of escape or during the commission of another felony.4"
In the same statutory scheme, "mitigators" involve the defendant's age;'4
his being under "unusual duress;"' no record of prior significant
criminal history;' the victim's consent to the conduct that led to his
death; 49 the rendering of substantial assistance to the state in the
39. See, e.g., Melody Martin, Defending the Mentally 1ll Client in Criminal
Matters: Ethics, Advocacy, and Responsibility, 52 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REv. 73 (1993)
(discussing ethical issues facing counsel in cases involving mentally disabled criminal
defendants); Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth, and Symbols in the
Adversarial Criminal Process: A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a
Proposal for Reform, 32 AM. CalM. L. Rv. 743 (1995) (discussing myth in criminal
cases); Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel
in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992) (discussing myth in
mental disability cases); Vick, supra note 17 (discussing myth in criminal cases).
40. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(2)(a) (West 1995).
41. See id. § 2C:11-3c(4)(a).
42. See id. § 2C:11-3c(4)(b).
43. See id. § 2C:11-3c(4)(c).
44. See id. § 2C:11-3c(4)(d)-(e).
45. See id. § 2C:11-3c(4)(f)-(g).
46. See id. § 2C:11-3c(5)(c).
47. See id. § 2C:11-3c(5)(e).
48. See id. § 2C:11-3c(5)(f).
49. See id. § 2C:11-3c(5)(b).
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prosecution of another on a murder charge;5" and two others that are
especially significant to this paper:
(a) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to
prosecution; [and]
(d) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law was significantly impaired as a result of mental disease or
intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense
to prosecution.'
Aggravating factors in New Jersey must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the state must also prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. 2 On this point, the
New Jersey Supreme Court is clear: "We can think of no judgment of any
jury in this state in any case that has as strong a claim to the requirement
of certainty as does this one." 53
The importance of mitigating evidence at the penalty stage "cannot be
overestimated."s" The sentencing authority must consider any relevant
mitigating evidence that a defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less
than death,55 a holding that flows from Gregg 6 and the Court's other
initial "modern" decisions upholding the death penalty, in which it
mandated that the sentencing authority be provided with adequate
individualized information about defendants and be guided by clear and
50. See id. § 2C:11-3c(5)(g).
51. Id. § 2C:ll-3c(5)(a),(d).
52. See State v. Biegenwald, 524 A.2d 130, 156 (N.J. 1987).
53. Id. at 155-56.
54. White, supra note 32, at 1434; see also White, supra note 6, at 338 (quoting
a leading capital defense lawyer as stating, "it's a rare case in which the capital
defendant has no mental problems").
55. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978); see generally 3 PRLIN, supra note 4, § 17.09, at 521-23
(discussing Eddings and Lockett). Statutes are collected in Ellen Fels Berkman, Mental
Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 291,
296-98 (1989).
56. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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objective standards. 7 These cases led Professor James Liebman and a
colleague to craft a four-part test to be employed in determining the
degree to which mitigation based on mental disorder would be proper in
a capital case:
1. whether the offender's suffering evidences expiation or
inspires compassion;
2. whether the offender's cognitive and/or volitional
impairment at the time he committed the crime affected his
responsibility for his actions, and thereby diminished society's
need for revenge;
3. whether the offender, subjectively analyzed, was less
affected than the mentally normal offender by the deterrent threat
of capital punishment at the time he committed the crime; and
4. whether the exemplary value of capitally punishing the
offender, as objectively perceived by reasonable persons, would
be attenuated by the difficulty those persons would have
identifying with the executed offender."
3. The Importance of Lockett and Eddings.5 9
In Lockett v. Ohio,' the Supreme Court substantially widened the
scope of mitigating evidence allowed at the penalty phase of a capital case,
concluding that, "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character
57. See Liebman & Shepard, supra note 4, at 759-60 n.17 (discussing the Court's
decisions in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)). On the ways that jury
instructions affect decision-making in this context, see Susie Cho, Capital Confiision: The
Effect of Jury Instructions on the Decision to Impose Death, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 532, 561 (1994) (criticizing the Supreme Court for relying on "intuitive
assumptions of juror infallibility"). On factors that influence jurors in insanity defense
cases, see Karen Whittemore & James R.P. Ogloff, Factors That Influence Jury Decision
Making: Disposition Instructions and Mental State at the Time of the Trial, 19 LAw &
HuM. BEHAV. 283 (1995).
58. 3 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 17.08, at 520 (quoting Liebman & Shepard, supra
note 4, at 818).
59. This section is adapted from MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAv AND MENTAL
DIsABILITY § 4.47(C), at 642-43 (1994).
60. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
[Vol. 41
"THE EXECUTIONER'S FACE IS ALWAYS WELL-HIDDEN"
or record that defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death. "61
Four years later, the Court expanded on its Lockett rule in Eddings v.
Oklahoma,6' holding that the sentencing authority must consider any
relevant mitigating evidence.63  In Eddings, during the sentencing
hearing, the defendant presented testimony that he was the product of a
broken family and the victim of child abuse.64 Psychological testimony
also showed that Eddings was emotionally disturbed and that his mental
and emotional development were at a level below his chronological age. 65
Further, a psychiatrist and a sociologist testified that Eddings could be
treated and rehabilitated.' Despite this testimony, the trial judge
considered only Eddings' youth as a mitigating factor, which, while
important, did not outweigh the aggravating factors presented by the
prosecution. 67
Reversing and remanding the sentence, the Supreme Court concluded
that the sentencer must consider all mitigating evidence and then weigh
this evidence against the aggravating circumstances.6" Thus, Eddings'
restatement of the Lockett rule requires the sentencing tribunal to "listen"
to any relevant evidence proffered to mitigate in a death penalty case. 69
Testimony found relevant as to Eddings' mental disorder, then, could not
be ignored. Read together, Lockett and Eddings thus "require the courts
to admit into evidence, and to consider, any claim raised by the defendant
in mitigation.""
61. Id. at 604. For a thoughtful analysis of Lockett's place on the Supreme Court's
jurisprudential death penalty continuum, see Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and
Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143 (1980).
62. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
63. See id. at 114.
64. See id. at 107-08.
65. See id. at 107.
66. See id. at 107-08.
67. See id. at 108-09. The state raised three aggravating circumstances in favor of
imposing a death sentence: "that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel,
that the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest,
and that there was a probability that defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Id. at 106-07.
68. See id. at 113-17.
69. See id. at 115 n.10.
70. C. Richard Showalter & Richard Bonnie, Psychiatry and Capital Sentencing:
Risks and Responsibilities in a Unique Legal Setting, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 159, 161 (1984) (emphasis added). For examples of more recent cases, see Lackey
v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111 (ex. Crim. App. 1991); and State v. Fierro, 804 P.2d 72
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4. After Lockett and Eddings7'
Building on the decisions in Lockett and Eddings, subsequent cases
have considered the guidance that must be given to juries in determining
whether mitigating circumstances have been presented, including both
statutory and nonstatutory factors.' In most cases, the judge must tell
the jury what a mitigating circumstance is, and what its function is in the
jury's sentencing deliberation.' This responsibility is not fulfilled simply
by telling the jurors that they may "consider" such circumstances.74
As testimony of mental disorder at the penalty phase is warranted by
the serious responsibility that devolves on the fact finder (usually the jury)
in a capital case, it is not strictly relegated in some jurisdictions to
mitigating factors but may also be presented by the prosecution so as to
evidence aggravating factors as well.75 Also, courts will weigh what is
perceived as the clarity and lucidity of conflicting expert testimony in
determining whether a mitigating factor is present.76
Such testimony as to mental disorder need not support a finding of
insanity.' On the other hand, courts are split on the question of the
relevancy of testimony as to the defendant's capacity for rehabilitation. 8
Further, testimony at the sentencing phase must be admitted even where
(Ariz. 1991).
71. This section is generally adapted from PERLIN, supra note 59, § 4.47(D), at
644-45.
72. See, e.g., Moody v. State, 418 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1982).
73. See Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1981).
74. See, e.g., Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775 (11 th Cir. 1984); Westbrook v. Zant,
704 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1983).
75. See, e.g., People v. Devin, 444 N.E.2d 102 (II1. 1982); State v. Brogdon, 457
So. 2d 616 (La. 1984); State v. Woomer, 299 S.E.2d 317 (S.C. 1982).
76. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 638 P.2d 696 (Ariz. 1981).
77. See Simmons v. State, 419 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 1982) (noting that at
sentencing, the defendant presented testimony of an examining psychiatrist who
concluded that, while the defendant was neither psychotic nor neurotic, while he knew
right from wrong, and while he was of normal intelligence, he suffered from a character
disorder and extreme emotional immaturity); see also State v. English, 367 So. 2d 815,
819 (La. 1979) (holding that at the penalty phase, even where the insanity defense is
rejected, "another dimension of mental condition comes into play").
78. Compare Simmons, 419 So. 2d at 320 (stating that the potential for rehabilitation
is an element of character, and thus may not be excluded from consideration as a
potentially mitigating factor), with VoIle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796, 804 (Fla. 1985)
(distinguishing Simmons, where proffered testimony of corrections consultants and prison
psychiatrists that defendant-if given life sentence rather than death-would be a "model
prisoner," was characterized as irrelevant to sentencing inquiry).
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a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity has been specifically rejected
at the guilt phase of the trial,79 or where the issue was never previously
raised.'
5. Penry and Mitigation8'
Finally, in Penry v. Lynaugh, 2 the Court's most recent decision on
this question involving a mentally disabled defendant, the Supreme Court
held that evidence as to the defendant's mental retardation was relevant to
his culpability and that, without such information, jurors could not express
their "reasoned moral response" in determining the appropriateness of the
death penalty.' There, the court found that assessment of the
defendant's retardation would aid the jurors in determining whether the
commission of the crime was "deliberate."' 4  Without a special
instruction as to such evidence, a juror might be unaware that his
evaluation of the defendant's moral culpability could be informed by his
handicapping condition.' Also, in attempting to grapple with questions
of future dangerousness or of the presence of provocation (both questions
that must be considered under the Texas state sentencing scheme), jurors
were required to have a "vehicle" to consider whether the defendant's
background and childhood should have mitigated the penalty imposed. 6
79. See People v. Moseley, 281 N.Y.S.2d 762, 765 (1967) (finding that defendant
was not attempting to re-litigate the issue of his legal insanity or criminal responsibility;
instead, he was properly endeavoring to persuade the jury that, while his mental illness
was not a defense to the crime, it may have rendered it impossible for him to exercise
any self-control and should, therefore, be considered in mitigation); see also Mines v.
State, 390 So. 2d 332, 337 (Fla. 1980) (finding of sanity does not eliminate consideration
of statutory mitigating factors concerning mental condition).
80. See Washington v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 577, 586 (Va. 1984).
81. This section is largely adapted from PERLIN, supra note 59, § 4.47(C), at 643.
82. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
83. Id. at 321 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185 (1988)). The
defendant in Penry was mentally retarded. See id. at 307. See generally 3 PERLIN,
supra note 4, § 17.09, at 282-84 (Supp. 1995) (discussing Penry). On the traditional role
of clemency in such cases, see Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting
the Pardoning Powerfrom the King, 69 TEx. L. REV. 569, 624-27 (1991).
84. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 322.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 322-26.
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Without such testimony, the jury could not appropriately express its
"reasoned moral response" on the evidence in question.'
C. Mental Disability and Execution8s
Mental disability is important in the death penalty process in other
ways as well. The issue of executing the insane has plagued the legal
system for centuries. In his classic treatise, Insanity and the Criminal
Law, 9 Dr. William White focused on the "general feeling of abhorrence
against executing a person who is insane."90 Although the roots of the
policy against execution of insane offenders are ancient, "no consensus
exists about the reasons for it, about the meaning of 'insane' in this
context, or the procedures which should be used to determine it."91 One
commentator suggests that attempts at prescribing appropriate standards
"have proved incoherent because they failed to confront the reality that
law and psychiatry rarely, if ever, exist separately from culture andpolitics.",,g
The Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Ford v. Wainwright93 brought
limited doctrinal coherence to this question. In Ford, a divided court94
concluded that the Eighth Amendment did prohibit the imposition of the
87. See id. at 328; see also, e.g., Kwan Fai Mak v. Blodgett, 754 F. Supp. 1490
(W.D. Wash. 1991) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel was demonstrated
where lawyer failed to adduce mitigating evidence regarding severe assimilation
difficulties experienced by adolescents from far eastern cultures when they relocate to the
United States).
88. This section is largely adapted from PERLIN, supra note 59, § 4.50, at 654-57.
89. WILLIAM A. WHITE, M.D., INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1923) (De
Capo ed. 1981).
90. Id. at 245.
91. Elyce H. Zenoff, Can an Insane Person Be Executed?, 16 PREVIEW U.S. SUP.
CT. CAS. 465, 466 (1986).
92. Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry,
14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 100 (1986).
93. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
94. On the question of what procedures were appropriate to satisfy the Constitution,
three justices joined Justice Marshall. See id. at 410. Justice Powell concurred on the
constitutional issue, and wrote separately on the issue of the appropriate procedures to
be followed in such a case. See id. at 418. Justice O'Connor (for herself and Justice
White) concurred in part and dissented in part. See id. at 427. Justice Rehnquist (for
himself and the Chief Justice) dissented. See id. at 431.
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death penalty on an insane prisoner.' On this point, Justice Rehnquist
dissented on behalf of himself and Chief Justice Burger.96 In his view,
the Florida procedures were "fully consistent with the 'common-law
heritage' and current practice on which the Court purport[ed] to rely," and
in their reliance on executive-branch procedures, "faithful to both
traditional and modern practice."' He thus rejected the majority's
conclusion that the Eighth Amendment created a substantive right not to
be executed while insane. 98
Ford is a curious and difficult opinion that reflects the ambiguity and
ambivalence that permeate this subject-matter." It is especially
perplexing in light of the Court's subsequent decision in Penry v.
Lynaugh'" in which it rejected the argument that defendant's mental
retardation barred capital punishment. l Although she conceded that the
execution of the "profoundly or severely retarded" might violate the
Eighth Amendment, Justice O'Connor suggested that such persons were
unlikely to be convicted or face that penalty in light of "the protections
afforded by the insanity defense today," " an observation astonishing
either in its nivet6 or its cynicism. 3 Although New York's new death
penalty statute on its face bars the execution of persons with mental
retardation,"° Penry is nonetheless important because it gives us both
95. See id. at 402-10 (concluding that a de novo evidentiary hearing on Ford's sanity
was required unless "the state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found
the relevant facts"); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13 (1963).
96. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 431 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 431-33.
98. Writing for herself and Justice White, Justice O'Connor agreed fully with this
aspect of Justice Rehnquist's two-justice dissent. See id. at 427 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. An early analysis of Ford saw it as "sanctioning a double paradox: condemned
prisoners are killed if they are sane, but spared if they are insane; insane prisoners are
cured in order that they may be killed." The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, 100 HARv. L.
REv. 100, 106 (1986) (citation omitted).
100. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
101. See id. at 332-34. On the relationship between Ford and Penry, see 3 PERLIN,
supra note 4, § 1.06A, at 296-77 (Supp. 1995).
102. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333. For an analysis of post-Penry litigation, see Thomas
Criswell, Due Process: Rios Grande: The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Examines
Mental Retardation as a Mitigating Factor in Rios v. Texas, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 373
(1994).
103. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY
DEFENSE 210-26, 372-74 (1994).
104. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
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insights into, and signals about the U.S. Supreme Court's attitudes toward
one population of persons with mental disabilities.
To some extent, Ford and Penry serve as paradigms for the Court's
confusion about cases involving mentally disabled criminal defendants. 0 5
Justice Rehnquist's and Justice O'Connor's opinions in Ford and Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Penry remain infused with the obsessive fear that
defendants will raise "false" or "spurious claims" in desperate attempts to
stave off execution. 6 This fear-a doppelganger of the public's "swift
and vociferous . . . outrage"107 over what it perceives as "abusive"
insanity acquittals, thus allowing "guilty" defendants to "beat the
rap"-remains the source of much of the friction in this area."'8
Justice O'Connor's Penry assertion that the insanity defense protects
against the conviction and punishment of persons with severe mental
disability stands in stark contrast to counsel's dismal track record in this
area." And, certainly, post-Ford litigation on this issue gives no
support whatsoever to this assertion." 0
D. The Role of Jurors.'
Scholars have expressed their skepticism about the use of a mental
illness defense in a capital punishment penalty phase, indicating that such
105. See generally Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled
Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or
"Doctrinal Abyss"?, 29 ARIz. L. REv. 1 (1987).
106. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 429 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107. INGO KEILITZ & JUNIUS P. FULTON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND ITS
ALTERNATIVEs: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (1984).
108. See, e.g., id. (noting that the "not guilty by reason of insanity"*verdict in the
Hinckley case led to public condemnation of the insanity defense).
109. See 3 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 15.23. For a stark case example, see Alvord
v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956, 957 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
110. See, e.g., Rector v. Bryant, 111 S. Ct. 2872 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731 (1990); Hamilton v.
Texas, 497 U.S. 1016 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution);
Johnson v. Cabana, 481 U.S. 1061 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of stay
of execution and denial of certiorari); see generally Perlin, supra note 39 (discussing the
general inadequacy of counsel in capital cases involving mentally disabled criminal
defendants).
111. This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of
Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of "Mitigating" Mental Disability
Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 239, 245-48 (1994).
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testimony raises issues of unpredictability and dangerousness to potentially
suggest to the jury that the defendant "poses a continuing risk to
society."12 While expert witnesses have predicted (with near
unanimity) that such a defense would be successful,"' research with
mock jurors (and archival research in cases involving actual jurors) has
revealed that (1) a defendant's unsuccessful attempt to raise an insanity
defense positively correlates with a death penalty verdict,"' (2) a mental
illness defense is rated as a less effective strategy than other alternatives
at the penalty phase (even including the alternative of raising no defense
at all),1"' and (3) jurors who are "death qualified"" 6 are more likely
to convict capital defendants who suffer from nonorganic mental
disorders. " 7
112. George E. Dix, Psychological Abnormality and Capital Sentencing: The New
"Diminished Responsibility," 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249,264 (1984); see generally
Lawrence T. White, The Mental Illness Defense in the Capital Penalty Hearing, 5
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 411,414-19 (1987) (discussing the effectiveness of the mental illness
defense). A significant number of defendants facing execution are mentally disabled.
See Michael Mello, On Metaphors, Mirrors, And Murders: Theodore Bundy And The
Rule Of Law, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 887, 919 n.162 (1990-1991)
(collecting studies). On the ways that imprisonment negatively affects mental health, see
Sheilah Hodgins & Gilles C6, The Mental Health of Penitentiary Inmates in Isolation,
33 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1991).
For a thoughtful inquiry into the role of the jury as "authorizing agents" for capital
punishment, see Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital
Trials: The View from the Jury, 79 IND. L.J. 1103 (1995). On the significance of the
extent to which jurors perceive their personal decision-making responsibilities in death
penalty cases, see Steven J. Sherman, The Capital Jury Project: The Role of
Responsibility and How Psychology Can Inform the Law, 70 IND. L.J. 1241 (1995).
113. See White, supra note 112, at 414-15 (discussing findings reported in Lawrence
T. White, Ph.D., Trial Consultants, Psychologists, and Prediction Errors, COURT CALL,
Spring 1986, at 1).
114. See Note, A Study of the California Penalty Jury on First-Degree Murder
Cases, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1296 (1969). This article, of course, predates the "modem"
death penalty jurisprudence that follows the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). But cf. Berkman, supra note 55 (arguing that considering
aggravating circumstances that flow from defendant's mental illness is constitutionally
impermissible).
115. See Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Trial:
An Analysis of Crimes and Defense Strategies, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 113 (1987).
116. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 171-83 (1986) (upholding
process of "death qualifying" jurors by which potential jurors with "conscientious
scruples" against the death penalty are excluded from jury service).
117. Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of
Insanity, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984).
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Fact-finders demand that defendants conform to popular, common-
sensical visual images of "looking crazy."18 This further "ups the
ante" for defendants raising such a defense. On the other hand, some
empirical evidence suggests that a mental illness defense may be successful
where the defendant presents expert testimony, where he has a history of
psychiatric impairment (especially where he has sought treatment), and
where he is able to present purportedly "objective evidence of
psychopathology."119 Also, empirical evidence reveals that fact-finders
will be more receptive to a mental status defense that does not involve
"planful" behavior,"2 and that, in coming to their conclusions, jurors
are likely to rely upon "implicit theories about the causes of
violence. "121
Reconciliation of jurors' attitudes with court doctrine is made even
more difficult by juror confusion over the proper role of mitigating
evidence, their lack of recognition of mitigating evidence when presented
with it, and their misunderstanding of its expected impact on their death
118. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wicka, 474 N.W.2d 324, 327
(Minn. 1991) (noting that both law and society are always more skeptical about a
putatively mentally ill person who has a "normal appearance" or "doesn't look sick").
See generally Perlin, supra note 38, at 724-27 (discussing the public's demand that
mentally ill defendants "look crazy").
119. White, supra note 112, at 415-18; see Ellsworth, supra note 117, at 90 (noting
that besides simply feeling that "mental illness is no excuse," jurors hostile to a mental
illness defense focused on the possibility that the defendant was malingering, and on his
prior failure to seek help for his problems). But cf. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 781
(La. 1992) (Cole, J., dissenting) (noting that "[s]ociety has the right to protect itself from
those who would commit murder and seek to avoid their legitimate punishment by a
subsequently contracted, or feigned, insanity"); Gilbert Geis & Robert F. Meier,
Abolition of the Insanity Plea in Idaho: A Case Study, 477 ANNALS 72, 73 (1985) (noting
that it was irrelevant to Idaho residents whether defendant's reliance on the insanity
defense was real or feigned); Henry Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons
Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 38 TFx. L. REV. 849, 861 (1960) (noting that a request
for psychiatric assistance was seen as evidence of malingering).
120. See Stephen L. Golding & Ronald Roesch, The Assessment of Criminal
Responsibility: A Historical Approach to a Current Controversy, in HANDBOOK OF
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 395, 400 (1. Weiner & A. Hess eds., 1987); Caton F. Roberts
et al., Implicit Theories of Criminal Responsibility: Decision Making and the Insanity
Defense, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 207, 209-10 (1987).
121. Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, JuryDecision Making in the Capital Penalty
Phase: Legal Assumptions, Empirical Findings, and a Research Agenda, 16 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 185, 199 (1992).
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penalty deliberations. 1'1 In cases such as Penry,"23 where the
defendant is mentally retarded, the problems may be further exacerbated
due to juror miscomprehension of mental retardation, their use of
stereotypes of mentally retarded persons, and their inability to understand
the impact of retardation on a defendant's culpability."
The dilemma here is compounded further by the fact that many mental
disorders of death row inmates are never identified:
[E]ither no one looks for them, or the defendants do not consider
themselves impaired, so they never request special evaluations.
Even when defendants are examined, they often are unaware of
what symptoms might mitigate their sentences. Their
inadequacies may make them less capable than other defendants
of obtaining competent representation or assisting their attorneys
in documenting types of neurological impairments that might be
important for purpose of mitigation."Z
It is thus no surprise to learn that as many as half of death row inmates
exhibit signs of serious mental illness or that ten to twenty percent
demonstrate significant mental retardation. 6
122. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists, Juries, and
Judges, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 423, 426-28 (1993). On jury confusion in death cases
in general, see Cho, supra note 57. On the psychology of jurors in death penalty cases,
see generally Sherman, supra note 112.
123. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
124. See George S. Baroff, Establishing Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: A
Potential Matter of Life and Death, 29 MENTAL RETARDATION 343, 344-45 (1991);
Robert Hayman, Beyond Penry: The Remedial Use of the Mental Retardation Label in
Death Penalty Sentencing, 59 UMKC L. REV. 17, 47 (1990); see also James W. Ellis
& Ruth A. Luckasson, The Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant, 53 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 414 (1985) (discussing doctrinal and practical issues); see generally David Rumley,
A License to Kill: The Categorical Exemption of the Mentally Retarded from the Death
Penalty, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1299, 1325 (1993) (discussing misconceptions about
mentally retarded persons).
125. Berkman, supra note 55, at 299 (citations omitted).
126. White, supra note 6, at 338; see also Berkman, supra note 55, at 298 (noting
that in one survey of 15 adult inmates, nine had psychiatric disorders and six were found
to be chronically psychotic); see generally Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending
Justice: The Unconstitutionality of the Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing of
Habeas Corpus Petitions by State Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 451, 483 (1990-91) (noting that "a substantial number of death row inmates
suffer from mental illness"); Perlin, supra note 38, at 715-17 (noting the "high degree
of concordance between clinical evaluations of sanity and subsequent legal dispositions").
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The riskiness of a mental illness defense must be considered in the
context of yet other evidence that a significant percentage of actual jurors
saw certain aspects of a defendant's demeanor-whether he looked
passive, unremorseful, or emotionless-as a critical operative factor in
determining whether or not to return a death sentence. 27 Other studies
reveal that a defendant's attractiveness is a significant trial variable (with
jurors treating attractive defendants more leniently than unattractive
defendants)" and that a defendant's "emotionless appearance" will have
negative trial consequences.' 29
These findings are particularly problematic in light of the fact that a
significant percentage of mentally disabled criminal defendants receive
powerful psychotropic medication while awaiting trial. 3 ' Among the
side effects of such medications are akinesia and akathesia, conditions that
may mislead jurors by making the defendant appear either apathetic and
127. See William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or
Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1,
40-41, 51-52 (1987). On the significance of the images that jurors regularly confront in
death penalty cases, see Sarat, supra note 112, at 1126-31. On the role of images in
death penalty litigation in general, see Doyle, supra note 11, at 420-27.
128. See Marybeth Zientek, Riggins v. Nevada: Medicated Defendants and
Courtroom Demeanor from the Jury's Perspective, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 215, 227
(1992) (reporting on research in Wayne Weiten & Shari Seidman Diamond, A Critical
Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 71, 74 (1979)).
129. See id. (reporting on research in Martin F. Kaplan & Gwen DeArment
Kemmerick, Juror Judgment as Information Integration: Combining Evidential and Non-
Evidential Information, 30 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 493 (1974)). For a
philosophical inquiry into the way that "character" is viewed in determinations of guilt
and punishment, see Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and Character to
Guilt and Punishment, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 99 (1966). On the
ways that jurors construct "responsibility" see also Sarat, supra note 112, and Sherman,
supra note 112.
130. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law, 16
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 151 (1993); Michael L. Perlin, Reading the Supreme Court's
Tea Leaves: Predicting Judicial Behavior in Civil and Criminal Right to Refuse Treatment
Cases, 12 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 37 (1991); see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 324-25 (1993) (noting that "[t]he mentally ill are subjected to medical and
psychiatric treatment which may involve the ... use of psychotropic drugs"); Riggins
v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]he side
effects of antipsychotic drugs may alter demeanor in a way that will prejudice all facets
of the defense").
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unemotional or agitated and restless.13' Another important side effect,
tardive dyskinesia-marked by "tic-like movements of the lips," "worm-
like contractions of the tongue," "pouting, sucking, smacking and
puckering lip movements," and "expiratory grunts and noises"-will
inevitably make defendants appear less "attractive" to jurors.1 2
E. Conclusion
In short, mental disability evidence is misconstrued and misunderstood
by counsel, by jurors, and by judges. It is frequently ignored, and often
seen as an aggravator rather than as a mitigator. It is critical that any
attempt to understand the "real life" application of the death penalty
(oxymoron intentional) include an understanding of the way that this
evidence is interpreted.
III. THE NEW YORK STATUTE 133
More than thirty years after the last execution in New York State,
Governor Pataki signed legislation in March 1995 reintroducing the death
penalty to the state's criminal justice system. 34 The final legislation is
significantly narrower than the typical post-Gregg35 statute, in that with
two exceptions, the only aggravating circumstances that a jury may
consider are elements of the crime that have already been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt; 136 the capital sentencing proceeding simply balances
131. See United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479,493-94 (4th Cir. 1987), on reh'g
en banc 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990) (noting that
heavily medicated defendantmight give jury "false impression of defendant's mental state
at the time of the crime"); see also Note, The Identification of Incompetent Defendants:
Separating Those Unfitfor Adversary Combat from Those Who Are Fit, 66 KY. L.J. 666,
668-71 (1978) (noting that defendant can alienate jury "if he displays such inappropriate
demeanor as grinning when gruesome details are discussed, losing his temper when
witnesses maintain he is a violent man, or acting indifferent to the proceedings").
132. Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "Just Say No": A History and Analysis of the
Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REv. 283, 304-07 (1992) (quoting Joseph
T. Smith & Robert I. Simon, Tardive Dyskinesia Revisited, 31 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q.
342, 343 (1985)).
133. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
134. See Executive Memoranda of Mar. 7, 1995, ch. 1, 1995 N.Y. Laws 2283
[hereinafter Executive Memoranda] (memorandum from Governor George E. Pataki
approving death penalty laws); Michael Lumer & Nancy Tenney, The Death Penalty in
New York: An Historical Perspective, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 81, 81 (1995).
135. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
136. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(6).
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any mitigating circumstances against the aggravating circumstances that
were found as part of the guilt phase. 37 Under the mitigation section
of the statute:
Mitigating factors shall include the following:
(b) The defendant was mentally retarded at the time of the
crime, or the defendant's mental capacity was impaired or his
ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute a
defense to prosecution;
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was
mentally or emotionally disturbed or under the influence of
alcohol or any drug, although not to such an extent as to
constitute a defense to prosecution; or
(f) Any other circumstance concerning the crime, the
defendant's state of mind or condition at the time of the crime, or
the defendant's character, background or record that would be
relevant to mitigation or punishment for the crime. 3 '
Elsewhere, the statute bars the execution of any individual who is found
to be mentally retarded at the time of the scheduled execution,' 39 a
section that Governor Pataki characterized as a "special measure of
protection."140
Importantly, the death penalty statute also provides for the creation of
a Capital Defender Office, specifically providing representation for death-
eligible defendants.14 The Office will represent some death penalty
defendants directly. 42 It will also establish panels jointly with the
presiding justices of the Appellate Division) to oversee the appointment of
private lawyers to provide representation in other death penalty cases.'43
137. See Mary R. Falk & Eve Cary, Death-Defying Feats: State Constitutional
Challenges to New York's Death Penalty, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 161, 220 (1995).
138. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(9).
139. See id. § 400.27(12).
140. See Executive Memoranda, supra note 134, at 2285.
141. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b(3) (McKinney 1995); see generally James Traub,
The Life Preserver, NEW YORKER, Apr. 8, 1996, at 47 (profiling Kevin Doyle, New
York State's Capital Defender).
142. See Daniel Wise, 4 Panels Named for Death Penalty Cases; Assignments
Include Counsel Compensation, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 1995, at 2.
143. See id. at 1.
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The panel for the First Department (Manhattan) includes two former state
supreme court judges and a former law school dean. 1" The New York
Court of Appeals has recently set a rate of $175 per hour for lead counsel
(and $150 for associate counsel) in death penalty cases. 45
The Office has retained, in addition to the typical fact investigators,
a cadre of employees known as Mitigation Specialists (all with
backgrounds in social work or the allied mental health professions) to
investigate the social histories of all death penalty clients in anticipation
of presenting mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of the case."
In addition, a budget makes available funds for outside forensic experts to
testify on the full range of mental status issues that could come before the
court in a death penalty trial.147
If there is to be a death penalty statute, one that creates a special
office to provide both legal and investigative services is certainly, on
paper, less problematic than one that is silent on the provision of
counsel. 14  The New Jersey experience suggests a helpful parallel.
There, the vast majority of death penalty defendants are represented by the
state Office of the Public Defender-a state-wide office with extensive
support staff and a budget for independent expert evaluations and forensic
testimony. 49 In the fourteen years since New Jersey reinstated the death
penalty, there have been no executions and only three of the first thirty-
four death sentences handed down by juries have been upheld by the state
supreme court.1 0
144. See id.
145. See Daniel Wise, Defense Counsel Pay Setfor Capital Cases:Maximum Hourly
Rates Highest in Nation, N.Y.L.J., June 11, 1996, at 1.
146. Telephone interview with Russ Stetler, Director of Investigations, New York
State Capital Defender Office (Jan. 12, 1996).
147. Id.
148. On the need for specialized defense systems in capital cases, see Michael
Moore, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: An Examination and Analysis of State
Indigent Defense Systems and Their Application to Death Eligible Defendants, 37 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1617, 1671 (1996) (noting that "indigent defense systems must find
specialized means of providing indigent capital defendants with adequate representation").
149. See Vick, supra note 17, at 389-90.
150. See Michael T. Nolan, Jr., Hell Bent on Intent: New Jersey Broadens the Class
of Death Eligible Defendants, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 195, 196 (1994). The three
cases upholding capital sentences are State v. Bey, 645 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1994) (defendant
killed victims after particularly vicious sexual assaults); State v. Martini, 619 A.2d 1208
(N.J. 1993) (defendant killed victim in course of kidnapping); and State v. Marshall, 613
A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992) (defendant hired "hit man" to murder his wife). Cf. Norman
Lefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in Capital Cases: The Indiana Experience
and Its Implications for the Nation, 29 IND. L. REV. 485, 532-33 (1996) (offering
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This alone, however, should not suggest that the New York system
will "work." First, as Russell Neufeld, Director of the New York Legal
Aid Society's Capital Defense Unit, has pointed out, in the new law there
are limits to the availability of counsel both on appeal and in collateral
proceedings.51  But, even assuming that competent counsel is provided
at every step of the proceedings, other potential problems still exist. In a
series of papers, I have argued that it is impossible to make any sense of
the criminal trial process (especially the way the legal system treats
mentally disabled defendants) without considering the importance of what
I call "sanism" 5 ' and "pretextuality."1 53  I will next examine these
issues and finally consider them through the additional filter of
"therapeutic jurisprudence." "
suggestions for improvement of Indiana's system).
151. See Russell Neufeld, Problems Defending Under New York's New Death
Penalty Law, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 143, 146-47 (1995) (stating that the statute does not
provide for right to counsel on federal habeas corpus challenges and limits provision of
counsel to providing representation on the first state-level quorum nobis petition).
152. See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REV. 373 (1992) [hereinafter
Perlin, Sanism]; Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and
the Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 47
(1993); Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist
Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15 (1993-94); Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law,
20 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 369 (1994) [hereinafter Perlin,
Understanding].
153. See Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of
"Ordinary Common Sense, "Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131 (1991) [hereinafter Perlin, Morality]; Michael L.
Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 625 (1993) [hereinafter Perlin, Pretexts]; Perlin, Understanding, supra note 152.
154. See Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights
of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to
Redemption?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 80 (1995); Michael L. Perlin, What Is
Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 623 (1993).
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"Sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character
as other irrational prejudices that causes, and is reflected in, prevailing
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.'56
It infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. 157 Sanism
is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based
predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and
deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged
"ordinary common sense" (OCS) and heuristic reasoning in an
unconscious response to events, both in everyday life and in the legal
process. 158
Judges are not immune from sanism. "[E]mbedded in the cultural
presuppositions that engulf us all,"'59 they express discomfort with social
science (or any other system that may appear to challenge law's hegemony
over society) and skepticism about new thinking. " This discomfort and
155. This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould,
Rashomon and the Criminal Law. Mental Disability Law and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431, 442-44 (1995).
156. The classic treatise is GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE
(1955).
157. The phrase "sanism" was, to the best of my knowledge, coined by Dr. Morton
Birnbaum. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on Its
Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 106-07 (F.
Ayd ed., 1974); see also Koe v. Califano, 573 F.2d 761, 764 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing
Birnbaum); Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness:
A Story of Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REv. 63, 92-93 (1991) (discussing Birnbaum's
insights).
158. See, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 103, at 388-90.
159. Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 329, 332 (1991).
160. The discomfort that many judges feel in having to decide mental disability law
cases is often palpable. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide
Questions of Competency? Stripping the Facade From United States v. Charters, 38 U.
KAN. L. REv. 957, 991 (1990) (discussing the court's characterization in United States
v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016
(1990), of judicial involvement in right to refuse antipsychotic medication cases as
"'already perilous' . . . reflecting the court's almost palpable discomfort in having to
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skepticism allow judges to take deeper refuge in heuristic thinking and
flawed, non-reflective OCS, both of which continue the myths and
stereotypes of sanism.' 6'
b. Sanism and the Court Process in Mental Disability Law Cases
Judges reflect and project the conventional morality of the community,
and judicial decisions in all areas of civil and criminal mental disability
law continue to reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes. 62  Their
language demonstrates bias against mentally disabled individuals' 63 and
contempt for the mental health professions. " Courts often appear
impatient with mentally disabled litigants, ascribing their problems in the
legal process to weak character or poor resolve. Thus, a popular sanist
myth is that "[m]entally disabled individuals simply do not try hard
enough. They give in too easily to their base instincts, and do not
exercise appropriate self-restraint." 6
confront the questions before it").
161. See Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary
Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 61-69 (1990); Perlin,
supra note 38, at 713-14.
162. See Perlin, Sanism, supra note 152, at 400-04. For a recent inquiry into other
related judicial biases, see generally Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 1 (1994).
163. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 1213, 1223 (5th Cir. 1974), as having the
defendant being referred to as a "lunatic"); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 569 (11 th Cir.
1983) (noting that the defendant was referred to as a "lunatic"); Pyle v. Boles, 250 F.
Supp. 285, 288-89 (N.D. W. Va. 1966) (noting that the trial judge accused the habeas
petitioner of "being crazy"); Brown v. People, 134 N.E.2d 760, 762 (II. 1956) (noting
that the judge asked the defendant, "You are not crazy at this time, are you?"); but cf.
State v. Penner, 772 P.2d 819 (Kan. 1989) (noting that witnesses were admonished not
to refer to the defendant as "crazy" or "nuts").
164. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Musolino, 467 A.2d 605 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
(holding that it was reversible error for the trial judge to refer to expert witnesses as
"headshrinkers"); compare State v. Percy, 507 A.2d 955, 957 (Vt. 1986) (reversing
conviction where prosecutor, in closing argument, referred to expert testimony as
"psycho-babble"), with Commonwealth v. Cosme, 575 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Mass. 1991)
(denying reversal where the prosecutor referred to the defendant's expert witnesses as
"a little head specialist" and a "wizard").
165. Perlin, Sanism, supra note 152, at 396; see, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric
of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REv. 197, 238 (1990) (noting that the Hinckley prosecutor
suggested to jurors, "if Hinckley had emotional problems, they were largely his own
fault"); see also State v. Duckworth, 496 So. 2d 624, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing
to exclude juror who felt defendant would be responsible for actions as long as he
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Sanist thinking allows judges to avoid difficult choices in mental
disability law cases. Their reliance on non-reflective, self-referential
alleged "ordinary common sense" contributes further to the pretextuality
that underlies much of this area of the law."6
2. In This Context
In this environment, it is easy to see how evidence of mental illness
ostensibly introduced for mitigating purposes can be construed by judges
as aggravating instead. 67 In one notorious Florida case, for example,
a trial judge concluded that because of the defendant's mental disability
(paranoid schizophrenia manifested by hallucinations in which he "saw"
others in a "yellow haze"), "the only assurance society can receive that
this man never again commits to another human being what he did to [the
brutally murdered decedent] is that the ultimate sentence of death be
imposed." 161
To a great extent, sanism in the death penalty decision-making process
mirrors sanism in the context of insanity defense decision-making. 69
Such decision-making is often irrational, rejecting empiricism, science,
psychology, and philosophy, and substituting in its place myth, stereotype,
bias, and distortion. It resists educational correction, demands punishment
regardless of responsibility, and reifies medievalist concepts based on
fixed and absolute notions of good and evil and of right and wrong.
Like the rest of the criminal trial process, the insanity defense process
is riddled by sanist stereotypes and myths. Examples include the
following:
* reliance on a fixed vision of popular, concrete, visual images of
"craziness";' 70
* an obsessive fear of feigned mental states; '7
"wanted to do them").
166. See generally Perlin, supra note 161 (discussing the psychodynamicsof insanity
defense jurisprudence).
167. See Berkman, supra note 55, at 299-300.
168. Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 885 (Fla. 1979) (vacating death sentence).
169. See PERLIN, supra note 103, at 387-92.
170. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284,297 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); State v. Clayton, 656 S.W.2d 344, 350-51 (Tenn. 1983).
171. See, e.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962); United States v.
Brown, 478 F.2d 606, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973), discussed in Peter Margulies, The
"Pandemonium Between the Mad and the Bad": Procedures for the Commitment and
Release of Insanity Acquittees After Jones v. United States, 36 RUTGERs L. REv. 793,
806-07 n.85 (1984).
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* a presumed absolute linkage between mental illness and
dangerousness;172
* sanctioning the death penalty in the case of mentally retarded
defendants, some defendants who are "substantially mentally impaired,"
or defendants who have been found guilty but mentally ill (GBMI); 3
and
* the regularity of sanist appeals by prosecutors in insanity defense
summations, arguing that insanity defenses are easily faked, that insanity
acquittees are often immediately released, and that expert witnesses are
readily duped.174
In each case, similar myths apply when a mentally disabled defendant
is being prosecuted in a capital case. And to confound matters,
"enormous pressures" will often be placed on defense counsel to play into
the hands of these myths and paint an exaggerated picture of a "totally
crazy" defendant to assuage jurors whose "ordinary common sense" 75
demands an all-or-nothing representation of mental illness. 76  The
importance of competent, trained, specialized counsel to identify and rebut
these sanist myths should be clear on its face.
A sampling of cases decided under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
similarly demonstrates the ways in which judges are frequently sanist. '77
Although these are not death penalty cases, the judicial attitudes reflected
are instructive. In rejecting defendant's "suicidal tendencies" as a possible
basis for a downward departure in an embezzlement case, the Sixth Circuit
held that departure would never be permissible on this basis because any
consideration of this argument would lead to "boiler-plate" claims and
force courts to "separate the wheat of valid claims from the chaff of
disingenuous ones," a "path before which we give serious pause." 1 78
172. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 (1983); Overholser v.
O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
173. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (mental retardation); Harris
v. State, 499 N.E.2d 723 (Ind. 1986) (GBMI); Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 595 A.2d
28, 38 (Pa. 1991) (substantial mental impairment); see also People v. Crews, 522 N.E.2d
1167 (Ill. 1988) (holding it permissible to sentence GBMI defendant to post-life
expectancy term).
174. See, e.g., People v. Camden, 578 N.E.2d 1211, 1223 (II1. 1991); People v.
Aliwoli, 606 N.E.2d 347, 353-54 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992).
175. See Perlin, supra note 161, at 61-69.
176. See Doyle, supra note 11, at 445 ("ITihere will be enormous pressures to craft
a representation that earns the defendant membership in a preexisting, stereotypical
category of 'acute' or 'extreme' illness, and to show that he fits into that category all
of the time-that he is all sickness, no function.").
177. See Perlin & Gould, supra note 155, at 452-55.
178. United States v. Harpst, 949 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1991).
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This argument tracks, nearly verbatim, the reasoning of the Fourth
Circuit, which refused to depart downward in the case of a defendant who
had suffered severe childhood sexual abuse, referring to the "innumerable
defendants" who could plead "unstable upbringing" as a potential
departure ground. 79
Underlying many of the Guidelines cases is a powerful current of
blame: the defendant succumbed to temptation by not resisting drugs or
alcohol and by not overcoming childhood abuse.1" This sense of blame
mirrors courts' sanist impatience with mentally disabled criminal
defendants in general, attributing their problems in the legal process to
weak character or poor resolve.'81 Thus, we should not be surprised to
learn that a trial judge, responding to a National Center for State Courts
survey, indicated that incompetent-to-stand-trial defendants could have




The entire relationship between the legal process and mentally
disabled litigants is often pretextual. This means simply that courts accept
(either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly
in dishonest (frequently meretricious) decision-making, specifically where
witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to
purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends." "
This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants in the judicial
system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants,
and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blas6 judging, and at times perjurious
and corrupt testifying. The reality is well-known to frequent consumers
of judicial services in this area: to mental health advocates and other
public defender/legal aid/legal service lawyers assigned to represent
patients and mentally disabled criminal defendants, to prosecutors and
179. United States v. Daly, 883 F.2d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 1989).
180. See generally Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 153, at 670-72.
18 1. See generally Bernard Weiner, On Sin Versus Sickness: A Theory of Perceived
Responsibility and Social Motivation, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 957 (1993).
182. Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 153, at 671,
183. This section is largely adapted from Perlin & Gould, supra note 155, at 445-
46.
184. Charles M. Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 1I SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 839, 840 (1974) (commenting on police testimony).
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state attorneys assigned to represent hospitals, to judges who regularly
hear such cases, to expert and lay witnesses, and, most importantly, to the
mentally disabled person involved in the litigation in question."s
The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are reflected both
in the testimony of forensic experts and in the decisions of legislators and
fact-finders."' Experts frequently testify in accordance with their own
self-referential concepts of "morality""8 and openly subvert statutory
and case-law criteria that impose rigorous behavioral standards as
predicates for commitment 8' or that articulate functional standards as
prerequisites for an incompetency to stand trial finding.'89 Often this
testimony is further warped by a heuristic bias. Expert witnesses, like the
rest of us, succumb to the seductive allure of simplifying cognitive devices
in their thinking and employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness effect
or attribution theory in their testimony.
This testimony is then weighed and evaluated by frequently sanist fact-
finders. 19  Judges and jurors, both consciously and unconsciously,
frequently rely on reductionist, prejudice-driven stereotypes in their
decision-making, thus subordinating statutory and case-law standards as
well as the legitimate interests of the mentally disabled persons who are
the subject of the litigation. Judges' predispositions to employ the same
sorts of heuristics further contaminate the process.9
185. See Perlin, Morality, supra note 153, at 133-35; Perlin, Pretexts, supra note
153, at 627-28.
186. See, e.g., Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D.C. 1987) (stating
that although a District of Columbia Code contained a provision that patient could seek
periodic review of commitment or independent psychiatric evaluation, in 22 years since
passage of relevant statute, not a single patient exercised rights to statutory review). The
significance of Streicher is discussed in Arlene S. Kanter, Abandoned but Not Forgotten:
The Illegal Confinement of Elderly People in State Psychiatric Institutions, 19 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273, 304-06 (1991-1992).
187. See, e.g., Cassia Spohn & Julia Homey, "The Law's the Law, but Fair Is
Fair": Rape Shield Laws and Officials' Assessments of Sexual History Evidence, 29
CRIMINOLOGY 137, 139 (1991) (stating that "a legal reform that contradicts deeply held
beliefs may result either in open defiance of the law or in a surreptitious attempt to
modify the law").
188. See, e.g., Perlin, Morality, supra note 153, at 135-36.
189. See, e.g., People v. Doan, 366 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)
(noting that the expert testified that the defendant was "out in left field" and went
"bananas").
190. See generally Perlin, Sanism, supra note 152; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note
152.
191. See generally Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 153; Perlin, supra note 160.
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2. In This Context
All of this data must be read in the context of other information about
mental disability, criminal law, and jury behavior. We know that jurors
adhere firmly to the belief that mental status pleas are overused in the face
of a unanimous empirical database as to their rarity, the greater rarity of
success, and the high risk to defendants raising such pleas." We know
that defendants are more likely to feign sanity rather than insanity (even
where the evidence of their mental disability might qualify as mitigating
evidence under Supreme Court doctrine). 93 We know how, as a result
of the vividness heuristic, one salient case can lead to the restructuring of
an entire body of jurisprudence. " We know how jurors over-predict
future dangerousness in death penalty cases. 95 We know how the
Supreme Court's "death qualification" jurisprudence for jury selection
makes it more likely that seated jurors will see mental nonresponsibility
defenses "as a ruse and as an impediment to the conviction of
criminals."' 96 We know that there is "a clear 'fit' between the
retribution-driven punitive response favored by authoritarians and the
authoritarian's resentment of the insanity defense and his general hostility
toward psychiatry.""
192. See Perlin, supra note 38, at 648-55. For a recent case example, see People
v. Seuffer, 582 N.E.2d 71, 79 (1Il. 1991).
193. See Perlin, supra note 38, at 715-17 (reporting on the research of, inter alia,
Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and Family
Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 584, 588 (1988); Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological,
and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States,
143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838, 841 (1986); P.J. Taylor, Motives for Offending Among
Violent and Psychotic Men, 147 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 491, 496-97 (1985)).
194. See James R.P. Ogloff, The Juvenile Death Penalty: A Frustrated Society's
Attempt for Control, 5 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 447 (1987) (discussing the scenario preceding
Vermont's elimination of a minimum age for prosecuting children as adults in murder
cases).
195. See James W. Marquart et al., Gazing into the Crystal Ball Can Jurors
Accurately Predict Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23 L. & Soc'y REv. 449, 466
(1989).
196. Ellsworth et al., supra note 117, at 90.
197. PERLIN, supra note 103, at 372 (citing, inter alia, Neil Vidmar & Dale T.
Miller, Socialpsychological Processes Underlying Attitudes Toward Legal Punishment,
14 L. & Soc'y REv. 565, 591 (1980)). On the ways that death penalty supporters are
motivated by "vindictive revenge," see Robert M. Bohm, Retribution and Capital
Punishment: Toward a Better Understanding of Death Penalty Opinion, 20 J. CRIM.
JusT. 227 (1992). On the relationship between religious belief and support for the death
penalty, see Harold G. Grasmick et al., Religious Beliefs and Public Support for the
19961
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
This data must be read side-by-side with what we know about juror
use of schema: that they are especially confused and confusing in death
penalty cases;' 9 that they "play to" menacing and dangerous stereotypes
of mentally disabled persons; 19 and that when there are dissonances in
these schema, they are interpreted in ways "consistent with
criminality. " It must be read further against the backdrop of ongoing
judicial hostility toward mental disability-based excuses for crime and
toward mental disability evidence in general.
As a result of these factors, application of the mitigation doctrine is
revealed, in certain individual cases, to be a pretextual hoax. Consider
the Florida case of Mason v. State.' Mason was convicted of murder
after the trial court failed to inform the jury about his "long history of
mental illness, the fact that he suffered from organic brain damage, that
he suffered from mental retardation, had a history of drug abuse, that he
attempted suicide on four occasions during [the prior year], and that he
has a history of suffering from depression and hallucinations."2"2 The
dissonance between the trial court's behavior in this case and the Supreme
Court's line of cases from Eddings" and Lockett"0 to Penry0 5
suggest that mere doctrinal analysis and recalibration can never be a
solution to the underlying problems.
Further, there is now an impressive body of social science research
that suggests that jurors frequently do not understand jury instructions as
to the construction of mitigating evidence.' t What could be more
pretextual than a system that relies on the transmission of information to
Death Penalty for Juveniles and Adults, 16 J. CRIME & JUST. 59 (1993) (stating that
adherence to a literal interpretation of the Bible is predictive of support for the death
penalty).
198. See Diamond, supra note 122, at 429-30.
199. See Hayman, supra.note 124, at 47-48 (noting that "[tiragically, the full range
of stereotypes victimizes the mentally retarded defendant at the capital sentencing stage").
200. Id. (relying on HANS TOCH & KENNETH ADAMS, THE DISTURBED VIOLENT
OFFENDER 18-19 (1989)).
201. 597 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1992).
202. Id. at 780.
203. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)
204. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
205. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
206. See Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors
Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1, 10-23 (1995); see also, e.g., Valerie P.
Hans, Death by Jury, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE APPROACHES 149, 168-71 (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988)
(discussing jury understanding of mitigating and aggravating evidence).
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fact-finders who cannot understand the information being transmitted?
Again, the presence of frequently inadequate counsel exacerbates this
problem even more and heightens the pretextuality of the entire capital
punishment process. Refusal by courts to acknowledge the regularly
substandard job done by counsel in this most demanding area of the law
is simply pretextual.1
In short, mental illness, rather than serving as a mitigating factor, is
often seen in reality as an aggravating factor. 2°s If competent counsel
is present, the dilemma may paradoxically be even further confounded: if
she should rely on certain kinds of "empathy" evidence-evidence of
abuse, stress, retardation, institutional failure, and substantive abuse-she
runs the risk of putting before the jury the evidence that "has the greatest
potential for turning into evidence in aggravation ...."0 In the hands
of sanist fact-finders, the presentation of such evidence can be deadly to
the defendant.
207. For recent relevant cases, see 3 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 17.10, at 285-87
n.245.1 (Supp. 1995). Compare, e.g., Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir.
1991) (stating that counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate the defendant's
mental retardation as a mitigating factor), Doyle v. Dugger, 922 F.2d 646 (11th Cir.
1991) (stating same involving extreme emotional disturbance), Francis v. Dugger, 908
F.2d 696 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (stating same involving fetal alcohol syndrome), McCoy v.
Lynaugh, 874 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating same involving mental illness evidence),
Prejean v. Smith, 889 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating same involving organic brain
syndrome evidence), Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating same
involving intoxication evidence), Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1988)
(stating same involving mental illness evidence), Thomas v. State, 511 So. 2d 248 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1987) (stating same involving mental illness evidence), and King v. State,
503 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1987) (stating same involving low intelligence), with Loyd v.
Smith, 899 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that the attorney's failure to explore
mitigating psychiatric evidence prejudiced the defendant), Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631
(9th Cir. 1988) (stating same), and Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491 (1lth Cir. 1988)
(stating same).
208. See Berkman, supra note 55, at 299-300; Hayman, supra note 124, at 47-48.
209. William S. Geimer, Law and Reality in the Capital Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273, 286 (1990-1991).
19961
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
C. Therapeutic jurisprudence"'
1. In General
One potential solution is to turn to therapeutic jurisprudence for some
answers. Therapeutic jurisprudence studies the role of the law as a
therapeutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures and
lawyers' roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic
consequences, and questioning whether such rules, procedures and roles
can or should be reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential,
while not subordinating due process principles.2 ' Therapeutic
jurisprudence looks at a variety of mental disability law issues in an effort
to both shed new light on past developments and to offer new insights for
future developments. Recent articles and essays have thus considered such
matters as the insanity acquittee conditional release hearing, juror
decision-making in malpractice and negligent release litigation,
competency to consent to treatment, competency to seek voluntary
treatment, standards of psychotherapeutic tort liability, the effect of guilty
pleas in sex offender cases, the impact of scientific discovery on
substantive criminal law doctrine, and the competency to be executed. 2
2. In This Context23
If therapeutic jurisprudence principles are applied to the questions
raised in this presentation, several inquires immediately surface. First, if
mental disability evidence can be seen as aggravating rather than
mitigating, what a powerful disincentive this may be for mentally disabled
criminal defendants to deny their mental illness and simultaneously refuse
to seek ameliorative treatment. If jurors especially turn "empathy"
evidence into evidence of aggravating circumstances, how will that affect
210. See generally ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler &
Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B. Wexler ed., 1990); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick
eds., 1996).
211. See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 1.05A (Supp. 1995); Perlin et al., supra
note 154; Perlin, Understanding, supra note 152; Perlin, supra note 154; David B.
Wexler, Justice, Mental Health, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 40 CLEv. ST. L. REV.
517 (1992); David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 27 (1992).
212. See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, supra note 4, § 1.05A, nn.156.6-156.24A (Supp. 1995).
213. This section is adapted from Perlin, supra note 111, at 278-79.
[Vol. 41
"THE EXECUTIONER'S FACE IS ALWAYS WELL-HIDDEN"
the already compromised relationship between counsel and the mentally
disabled client?
In 1993, the Supreme Court held in Godinez v. Moran214 that the
standard for waiving counsel or for pleading guilty was to be no more
stringent than the standard for competence to stand trial." 5 If Godinez
causes more severely mentally disabled defendants to be tried in life-or-
death cases without the aid of counsel, what will the impact be on penal
settings (especially death row settings) if there is a significant influx of
additional mentally ill prisoners?" 6  Even if considered from the
perspective of victims, there are therapeutic jurisprudence issues.
Representatives of victims' rights organizations have testified before an
ABA Task Force that adequate representation at all stages of the death
penalty trial and appellate process was in the best interests of their
constituencies. 1 7
In short, any death penalty system that provides inadequate counsel
and that, at least as a partial result of that inadequacy, fails to insure that
mental disability evidence is adequately considered and contextualized by
death penalty decision-makers, fails miserably from a therapeutic
jurisprudence perspective.
V. CONCLUSION
The New York capital punishment statute is still new and untested.
There is no question that its passage met with wide public approval.2 8
And, as death penalty statutes go, it is certainly not as onerous-on
paper-as those that have passed constitutional muster in other states.2 9
The Capital Defender Office strikes me as a model that could be well
replicated in every death penalty jurisdiction in this nation.
Yet I am still certainly not convinced the death penalty will be
administered fairly and even-handedly in each New York county. I am
not convinced that judges and jurors will shed their sanist biases in dealing
with allegedly mitigating mental disability evidence, and I am not
214. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
215. See id.
216. See Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity was the First to Leave": Godinez v. Moran,
Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAv.
SCl. & L. 61 (1996).
217. See ABA REPORT, supra note 12, at 56.
218. See Stephanie Saul, Death Penalty Push; The Public Supports It, but Does It
Work as a Deterrent?, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 24, 1994, at 7.
219. See James Dao, New York Leaders Offer Limited Bill on Death Penalty, N.Y.
TiMES, Mar. 4, 1995, at 1.
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convinced that the system will be one that will be administered in a
manner free of pretextuality.
I end as I began, with Bob Dylan. The song from which I took the
title for this paper-A Hard Rain's A-Gonna Fall-is widely seen as
describing an environmental apocalypse. The lines preceding and
following the line quoted in my title, however, are all equally relevant to
the question before us:
Where the people are many and their hands are all empty,
Where the pellets of poison are flooding their waters,
Where the home in the valley meets the damp dirty prison,
Where the executioner's face is always well-hidden,
Where hunger is ugly, where souls are forgotten,
Where black is the color, where none is the number,
And it's a hard, it's a hard, it's a hard, it's a hard,
It's a hard rain's a-gonna fall.'
Unless we openly confront the problems raised by inadequate counsel
and by our inability to appropriately weigh mitigating evidence of mental
disability, we will inevitably be faced with the bleak future of individuals
in the "damp dirty prison" confronting the executioner's well-hidden face.
220. BOB DYLAN, A Hard Rain's A-Gonna Fall, on THE FREEWHEELIN' BOB
DYLAN (Columbia Records 1963).
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